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Communist rule did not end suddenly in 1989, or in 1991. And for many, at least in Russia,
there was no radical break but a complex evolution in which many of the former ruling
group, and many of the values of the Soviet period, remained intact. According to the
evidence of national representative surveys, levels of support for the principle of a union
state have consistently been very high. In 2008 survey, more than half (57%) largely or
entirely agreed that the demise of the USSR had been a ‘disaster’, and nearly two-thirds
(64%) thought the former Soviet republics that had established a Commonwealth of
Independent States should reconstitute a single state or at least cooperate more closely.
Across the three Slavic republics, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, it was guaranteed
employment that was seen as the most positive feature of the old regime, and economic
stagnation as its most serious shortcoming. Comparing the present and the Soviet period
as they recalled it, ordinary Russians thought they had more opportunity to practise
a religion, and to express their opinions. But ordinary people had (in their own view) no
more inﬂuence over the making of public policy than in the communist period, and they
thought they were less likely to be treated fairly and equally by government. Age and living
standards were the most powerful predictors of Soviet nostalgia when other variables
were held constant. Nostalgics were much more likely to support parties of the left, or at
least those that favoured public ownership, a Soviet or ‘more democratic Soviet’ system of
government, and a closer association among the former Soviet republics; they were much
less likely to support the parties that favoured the dissolution of the CIS, a wholly market
economy, or Western-style democracy.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.‘Communism – world tour, 1917–1989’, declared the
T-shirts. It was a judgement that reﬂected the dramatic
changes that had just taken place in Central and Eastern
Europe as long-established communist regimes gave way
to their opponents, or even to governments that were
headed by former dissidents like Va´clav Havel, a prisoner
earlier the same year, or the Polish prime minister5071.
Research Center, Hanyang UniverTadeusz Mazowiecki, a prisoner in the early 1980s. Nic-
olae Ceaus¸escu, re-elected for another ﬁve years at the
Romanian party congress in November 1989, had been
executed a month later. The East German party leader
Erich Honecker, forced to resign in October, was charged
with corruption in December and placed under house
arrest. Todor Zhivkov, Bulgarian party leader since 1954,
was accused of establishing the ‘dictatorship of a clan’
and arrested at the start of the new year. The USSR itself
dissolved at the end of 1991, and Boris Yeltsin took over
the leadership of an independent Russia. All, apparently,
had changed, and changed utterly.
This was, of course, a hasty and incomplete judgement.
For a start, communist rule continued elsewhere: in Cuba,
and parts of Asia. Taking into account the enormous andsity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer review under
3 Zaslavskaya, Sovremennoe rossiiskoe obshchestvo, p. 191; this broadly
S. White / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 1–92increasing number that lived in the People’s Republic of
China, there were almost as many who lived under
communist rule in 2009 as had lived under communist rule
in a rather larger number of countries ten years earlier: 1.4
billion, which was more than a ﬁfth of the world’s entire
population, as compared with 1.6 billion in 1989. This was
scarcely the ‘end of history’. And there were many more
who lived under postcommunist rule as formerly ruling
parties changed their name, dropped their claims to
a political monopoly and contested elections, in some cases
with great success; in Moldova the party that won two
successive general elections was still called the Party of
Communists. 1989 had certainly been a setback for
Leninism; it was not necessarily such a reverse for parties
that placed their emphasis on an emancipation of the
working class that was to be the achievement of workers
themselves, not of a vanguard party that took decisions on
their behalf and then imposed them.
Nor was it entirely clear what kind of change had taken
place at the end of the 1980s. For the Russian president
Boris Yeltsin, speaking immediately after the collapse of the
attempted coup of August 1991, the Russian people had
‘thrown off the shackles of seventy years of slavery’ and
were on their way to a ‘parliamentary democracy’.1 Writing
later, he was even more extravagant. If the election of
Russia’s ﬁrst president had been a ‘national’ development,
he claimed, the defeat of the coup had been a ‘global,
planetary event’ that had brought the twentieth century
itself to an end – apparently anticipating Eric Hobsbawm’s
Short Century, which appeared later the same year (El’tsin,
1994). Yeltsin’s prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, went further,
claiming that the end of communist rule had been a ‘revo-
lution comparable in its inﬂuence on the historical process
to the Great French Revolution, the Russian revolution of
1917, and the Chinese revolution of 1949’ (Gaidar,1996). For
two Gaidar associates, the changes that were associated
with the end of communist rule in Russia could be placed
within a still more extended lineage, from Cromwell in the
17th century to the great social revolutions of moremodern
times (Starodubrovskaya & Mau, 2001).
Others, however, were more doubtful, including the
veteran sociologist Tat’yana Zaslavskaya. In her view, there
were several reasons to reject the proposition that
a fundamental social revolution had taken place. One of
them was that the new ruling group consisted over-
whelmingly of the former nomenklatura, while in Central
and Eastern Europe it was ‘oppositional social forces’ that
had mostly come to power (Zaslavskaya, 2004). The most
elaborate study of its kind found that more than 80% of the
former Soviet nomenklatura had moved into positions that
were either in the ﬁrst or second rank of the post-
communist elite, and conversely, that almost 80% of the
postcommunist elite had enjoyed elite or ‘pre-elite’ posi-
tions in the late Soviet period.2 There were grounds for1 Izvestiya, 23 August 1991, p. 1, and 12 November 1991, p. 1.
2 Ershova (1994); there is a fuller statement in B. V. Golovachev et al.,
‘Formirovanie pravyashchei elity v Rossii’, Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye
peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya no. 6, 1995, pp. 18–24
(part 1) and no. 1, 1996, pp. 32–38 (part 2).arguing that the Soviet ‘transition’ had been precisely
a takeover by this lower-level nomenklatura, seeking to
convert their temporary advantages into the enduring form
of private property in what Zaslavskaya suggested could be
seen as the ‘completion of an anti-socialist (and in its social
nature, bourgeois) coup, begun by Stalin in the late 1920s
but not taken to its logical conclusion’.3
Similarly, Zaslavskaya suggested, there had been no
mass movement, no ‘people power’ that had driven the
former ruling group from ofﬁce. It had been the regime
itself that had been the driving force of change, and the
political energies of ordinary people had scarcely been
engaged at any point. There had been very little violence,
compared even with the ‘velvet revolutions’ in East-
Central Europe. And it was hard to conceive of a great
social revolution if, as in Russia, it had ‘scarcely been
noticed by the society in which it had taken place’ (Zas-
lavskaya, 2002: 6). For Zaslavskaya, accordingly, there
had been ‘evolution’, rather than ‘revolution’; what had
taken place was more accurately described as a move-
ment led by a well educated but dissatisﬁed intelligentsia
against the power of the nomenklatura and in favour of
a ‘perfection of socialism’ that would extend its demo-
cratic credentials and improve the well being of ordinary
people. But the reform movement led by the intelli-
gentsia had been blocked, and did not survive the
collapse of the USSR itself; the political initiative had
passed at this point to a clique around Boris Yeltsin, who
had presided over the plundering of public assets,
wholesale criminalisation and the collapse of state
authority (Zaslavskaya, 2002: 6–9).1. Looking back at the USSR
The USSR, meanwhile, remained a popular institution,
and not just for Russians.4 There was a turnout of 80% in
the referendum that took place in March 1991 on its
continuation as a ‘renewed federation of equal sovereign
republics in which the human rights and freedoms of
people of every nationality [would] be fully guaranteed’.
More than 76% voted in favour; Belarusians (83%) were
even more enthusiastic than Ukrainians (70%) and
Russians (71%), and voters in Central Asia were more
enthusiastic than any of them. There was little popular
resistance to the attempted coup in August 1991, and little
support for the hasty and probably unconstitutional deci-
sion to terminate the USSR the following December – an
‘elite pact’ of a rather peculiar kind, conducted by a Russian
president, Boris Yeltsin, who was in no position to reason
clearly (according to participants he was ‘so drunk he fell
out of his chair’) (David, 1997), and who had in any case no‘trotskyist’ perspective is well presented in David and Fred (1997).
4 Here and elsewhere I have drawn on an earlier discussion that uses
different survey evidence: ‘Communist nostalgia and its consequences in
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine’, in David Lane, ed., The Transformation of
State Socialism: System Change, Capitalism or Something Else? (London and
New York: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 35–56. Among several other discussions of
communist ‘nostalgia’, see particularly Ekman and Linde (2005); Sarah
and Theodore (2005–2006); and Neil (2006).
Table 1
Views of the October revolution (1990–2007). Source: adapted from www.levada.ru; the second question not asked in 2006.
1990 1997 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
‘With which
of the following
opinions about the October
revolution are you most
in agreement?’
It stimulated
economic and social development
24 26 27 27 32 27 31 28 31
It opened a new era in Russian history 22 23 32 33 20 30 26 30 24
It slowed
down Russia’s development
19 19 18 19 19 16 16 16 17
It was a catastrophe
for the Russian peoples
13 16 12 9 14 14 15 10 9
Hard to say 22 17 11 13 15 13 13 17 19
‘Imagine the October
revolution was taking
place at the moment,
what would you do?’
I would
actively support the Bolsheviks
23 15 22 23 19 15 17 – 17
I would
somewhat support the Bolsheviks
26 16 19 20 16 18 17 – 13
I would
try to keep
out of it
12 27 24 28 22 26 28 – 23
I would
struggle against the Bolsheviks
5 7 6 8 9 8 7 – 6
I would go abroad 7 15 13 16 14 15 14 – 18
Hard to say 27 20 16 5 21 19 17 – 24
S. White / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 1–9 3prior commitment to the dissolution of the union (Alek-
sandr, 1997). Levels of support for the principle of a union
state have consistently been very high; in our 2008 survey,
more than half (57%) largely or entirely agreed that the
demise of the USSR had been a ‘disaster’, and nearly two-
thirds (64%) thought the former Soviet republics that had
established a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
should reconstitute a single state or at least cooperate
more closely.13
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Fig. 1. Communism:Substantial numbers, indeed, continue to insist that it
would have been better if the Soviet system had remained,
and in the form it had acquired before perestroika. About
half of those who were asked by the Levada Centre in
January 2005, for instance, thought it ‘would have been
better if everything had stayed the way it was before
1985’. Why? Because ‘we were a big, united country’, and
‘there was order’ (both 26%); in addition, there was
‘certainty in the future’ (24%) and ‘prices were low and9
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Fig. 2. Communism: bad features.
5 Argumenty i fakty, no. 12, 1996, p. 1.
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been a positive development, but nearly three times as
many (56%) took the opposite view (Yuri, 2005). And even
if there were many who believed that perestroika had, all
the same, been necessary, it should have been conducted
in a different way: ‘without destroying the socialist order’
(33%), or by ‘ﬁrmly developing market relations in the
economy, but not rushing the development of democracy’
(19%) (Gorshkov & Petukhov, 2005). Looking back, it was
the industrialisation of the late 1920s and 1930s that was
seen as the most positive period in Russia’s entire twen-
tieth-century experience, followed by the moves towards
constitutional government at the start of the century and
the ‘thaw’ under Khrushchev in the 1950s and early
1960s; perestroika was seen as the most damaging of all
the changes that had taken place over the same period,
followed closely by the transition to a market economy in
the 1990s and the collectivisation of agriculture in the
1930s (Gorshkov, 2003).
Asked in October 2007 what view they took of the
October revolution in particular, more than half thought it
had ‘opened a new era in the history of the Russian people’
(24%) or ‘given a stimulus to economic and social devel-
opment’ (31%), rather more than had shared this opinion in
1990 (see Table 1). Lenin was the ﬁgure of the time who,
more than anyone else, aroused the greatest sympathy
(27%); he was followed by the secret police chief Felix
Dzerzhinsky and then Joseph Stalin. Some 17% said they
would support the Bolsheviks in the hypothetical event of
another October revolution and another 13% would at least
cooperate with them, many more than the 6% that would
support their opponents, although still larger numbers
would remain on the sidelines or emigrate. In all three
countries, the changes that had taken place were clearly
more complicated than a ‘transition to democracy’: it was
hardly a transition, not necessarily to democracy, led by
a section of the regime itself. Russians, at least, often
preferred to use the neutral term ‘the collapse of the union’
(raspad soyuza) for what had happened at the end of 1991,without making larger and more complex value
judgements.
The weekly paper Argumenty i fakty went out into the
streets in the mid-1990s to ask ordinary Russians to put
their responses into their ownwords. The ﬁrst person they
talked to, a young man temporarily out of work, was ‘for
the USSR, however stupid that might sound’. Elena,
a businesswoman, was against – it could ‘only mean the
return of psychiatric prisons, lies and censorship’. But
Ruslan from Tajikistan wanted ‘everything to be like it was
before’. Sergei from Moscow thought the three ‘Slavic
brothers’ were ‘simply fated to live together’. A visitor from
Grozny was ‘for the Soviet Union, naturally’. And Boris,
a down and out, had a simple explanation: ‘When there
was a USSR, I had a ﬂat. Now there is no USSR – and I’ve no
ﬂat either’.5 The largest proportion of those who were
asked in the late 1990s to identify their ‘homeland’, in fact,
told interviewers it was the USSR (28%), just ahead of the
proportion who thought it was Russia (27%), and nearly as
many thought it was the region inwhich they lived (United
States Information Agency (USIA), 1996).
2. Evaluating the communist everyday
Russians, together with the other Slavic peoples,
certainly have a complex and differentiated view of the
Soviet system that was formally dissolved at the end of 1991.
We asked, in a succession of national surveys, what ordinary
members of the society thought were the ‘best’ and ‘worst’
features of the communist system they had recently expe-
rienced. The evidence is set out in Figs. 1 and 2; further
details of the surveys themselves are provided in the
Appendix. Across the three Slavic republics, Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus, it was guaranteed employment that was seen
as the most positive feature of the old regime. There was
also approval for the way in which the former regime had
Table 2
The ‘Best’ and ‘Worst’ features of communist rule in Russia, 1993–2008. Source: 1993, 2001 and 2005 and 2008 Russian surveys; responses in rounded
percentages; don’t knows and no answers account for residuals. Respondents were asked to identify one positive and one negative feature from a list
supplied.
‘Best’ features 1993 2001 2005 2008 ‘Worst’ features 1993 2001 2005 2008
Job security 29 27 31 26 Too much bureaucracy 32 26 27 21
Interethnic peace 24 24 20 20 Economic stagnation 11 18 25 29
Economic stability 22 20 17 16 Human rights 17 9 14 11
Law and order 12 11 13 19 Corruption 15 12 8 10
More equality 7 11 14 20 Pollution 12 8 7 7
None 7 2 2 2 None 13 12 10 9
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ties, especially in Belarus (oddly perhaps, in that it was the
least ethnically divided of the three societies). Economic
stability was also important, especially in Ukraine.
Substantial numbers, in addition, approved of the way in
which the Soviet system hadmaintained ameasure of social
equality, and public order. There were in fact very few who
could ﬁnd no positive features at all in the former regime.
There was a substantial measure of agreement, equally,
about the features of the old regime that were least
acceptable. It was either ‘economic stagnation’, particularly
in Russia, or ‘excessive bureaucracy’, particularly in
Ukraine. Violation of human rights was in third place, but it
was just as important a shortcoming as economic stagna-
tion in Ukraine. Corruption and environmental pollution
were mentioned by rather fewer, and about one in ten
thought the old system had no negative features at all. We
asked identical questions in Russia alone in 1993 as well as
2001, 2005 and 2008; the results are set out in Table 2. On
the whole, there was more stability than change; but there
was a striking increase in the proportion who thought the
social equality of the Soviet period was to be commended.
Among the negative features of the Soviet system, rather
more drew attention to its failure to develop economically
and rather fewer were concerned about its excessive
bureaucracy. About 10%, over the whole period, thought it
had no negative features at all.
Russians have also been asked to suggest the charac-
teristics they associate with their current regime, and with
the Soviet system of the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 3,
which is based on the regular surveys of the All-RussianTable 3
Comparing Soviet and postcommunist rule in Russia, 1998 and 2005. Source: A
Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniya no. 1(81), January–February 2006, p. 10, showi
year.
Soviet rule, 1970s–1980s 1998 2001 2005 Pos
Close to the people 36 30 34 Crim
Legal 32 22 28 Rem
‘Our own’, familiar 32 24 26 Irre
Bureaucratic 30 26 30 We
Strong, ﬁrm 27 25 30 Sho
Short-sighted 23 14 21 Bur
Authoritative, respected 21 21 24 Para
Secretive, closed 17 4 13 Illeg
Just 16 16 11 Unp
Honest, open 14 11 13 Lim
Criminal, corrupt 14 13 12 EduCentre for the Study of Public Opinion and subsequently
the Levada Centre). Popular images of both systems have
changed relatively little over the years. Communist rule, in
spite of its lack of fully or – until its ﬁnal years – even
partly competitive elections, had many shortcomings: it
was bureaucratic, short-sighted and secretive. But its
virtues were more apparent. It was ‘close to the people’,
‘legal’, and ‘our own’ – in other words, accessible, indige-
nous, and (for ordinary Russians) legitimate. Post-
communist rule, by contrast, was associated with crime
and corruption more than anything else; but it was also
remote, irresolute, weak (less so under Putin than under
Yeltsin), short-sighted, and more bureaucratic – by 2005 –
than the communist system it had replaced. Indeed, the
postcommunist system had hardly any positive features,
in this inquiry; it was also parasitic, illegal (in spite of its
independent courts and competitive elections), and
incompetent.
We asked a series of more speciﬁc questions about
particular freedoms in the Soviet period and after it
(Table 4). There is little doubt, for ordinary Russians, that
they have more opportunity to practise a religion than in
the late communist period, and to express their opinions
in any way they wish. Similarly, they think it is easier to
choose whether or not to join an organisation, and to
decide whether or not to take part in politics (in the
communist period, it was often suggested, everything that
was not banned was compulsory); but they think there
has been no more than a modest improvement in the
protection of citizens from the threat of illegal arrest.
Most strikingly of all, ordinary people have (in their owndapted from Ekonomicheskie i sotsial’nye peremeny, no. 3, 1998, p. 57 and
ng all qualities that were reported by at least 10% of respondents in either
tcommunist rule, 1990s–2000s 1998 2001 2005
inal,S corrupt 63 50 62
ote, alien 41 34 42
solute 32 25 29
ak, powerless 31 21 20
rt-sighted 28 17 25
eaucratic 22 24 39
sitic 18 12 15
al 13 10 16
rofessional 13 7 12
ited 12 4 8
cated, intelligent 6 12 13
Table 4
Changes since communist rule in Russia, 2001–2008. Source: 2001, 2005 and 2008 Russian surveys, rounded percentages; don’t knows and non-responses
account for residuals. The question about equal treatment was not asked in 2001; a question about freedom of travel (better for 48%, worse for 30%) was not
asked in 2005 or 2008. Question wording was: ‘Compared with the Soviet period, have the following become easier or more difﬁcult?’; options were
respectively ‘For everyone to freely resolve questions of his/her religious life’, ‘To join any organisation’, ‘To decide freely whether or not to take part in
political life’, ‘For everyone to freely express what they think’, ‘People can live without worrying about illegal arrest’, ‘For ordinary people to inﬂuence
government policy’, and ‘Government deals with all citizens equally and fairly’.
Somewhat/much better The same as before Somewhat/much worse
2001 2005 2008 2001 2005 2008 2001 2005 2008
Religious freedom 79 85 81 12 11 13 2 2 2
To join any organisation 76 77 72 10 13 17 3 4 5
To take part in politics 69 75 69 17 17 22 4 3 5
Freedom of speech 77 75 72 12 18 19 5 5 6
Freedom from illegal arrest 24 42 42 34 33 31 19 17 14
Ability to inﬂuence
government policy
14 19 23 47 44 45 28 33 25
Equal and fair
treatment from government
– 11 21 – 38 37 – 44 33
S. White / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 1–96view) no more inﬂuence over the making of public policy
than they enjoyed in the communist period, in spite of
the introduction of competitive elections, the rule of law
and freedom of speech, although the largest proportion of
all think there has simply been no change; and they think
they are less likely to be treated fairly and equally by
government.
These, moreover, were not just Russian responses
(Table 5). By very large majorities, ordinary people in
Belarus and Ukraine as well as Russia thought they had
more freedom to express religious beliefs than in the
years of communist rule, more freedom to decide
whether or not to engaged in politics, and more freedom
to decide whether or not to join a public organisation
(Ukrainians were generally the most positive, with
Belarusians at the other extreme). But there was much
less evidence of a positive change in the relationship
between citizens and government. On the contrary, there
was nowhere that a majority thought they were less likely
to suffer illegal arrest (Ukrainians thought an illegal arrest
was slightly more likely than in the years of communist
rule; similar numbers thought there had been no change).
In every case there were more who thought it was less
likely than before that ofﬁcials would treat them fairly
and equally (the differences were particularly striking in
Ukraine). And in every case (although only marginally in
Russia) there were more who thought they were lessTable 5
Changes since communist rule, 2007–2009. Source: 2009 Belarus, 2008 Russian
residuals. The question wording invited comparisons between the present day a
Belarus 2009
Agree Disa
Freedom of religious life 84 5
Freedom to decide whether or not
to participate in politics
65 12
No need to fear illegal arrest 39 25
Everyone has freedom of speech 41 30
You can join or not join any organisation 63 12
Ofﬁcials treat citizens equally 25 40
Ordinary people can inﬂuence government policy 21 48likely to be able to exercise an inﬂuence on their national
government than had been the case during the years of
Soviet rule.
Taking everything together, did our respondents, on the
whole, regret the demise of the USSR? The evidence is set
out in Fig. 3. Russians clearly did so, by more than two to
one; but a plurality in the other two countries took the
opposite view. For Russians, it appears, ‘the USSR’ means
the Soviet system, with its positive as well as negative
features. But for Belarusians and Ukrainians it was also
a time in which their countries had been union republics
and not independent states, in spite of their representation
in the United Nations. To regret the demise of the USSR was
to regret the end of a period in which they had been ruled
from Moscow, not by their own elected institutions; not to
regret its demise was to afﬁrm the importance of national
sovereignty, without necessarily implying a rejection of the
economic and political system that had prevailed in Soviet
times. There was, of course, an association: those who
regretted the demise of the USSR were the most likely to
favour the Soviet system, and vice versa. But evidence of
this kind is further conﬁrmation of the need to disaggre-
gate: a ‘nostalgic’ view of the USSR was not the same as
a positive view of the Soviet system, and a negative view of
the USSR, particularly outside Russia, did not necessarily
mean a rejection of the principles on which it had been
founded.and 2007 Ukrainian surveys, rounded percentages; ‘neither’ accounts for
nd ‘Soviet times’.
Russia 2008 Ukraine 2007
gree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
81 2 89 4
69 5 85 6
42 14 32 36
72 6 70 11
72 5 84 6
21 33 13 71
23 25 21 58
65
54
39
70
63
66
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41
48
0
10
20
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40
50
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70
80
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Belarus Russia Ukraine
Fig. 3. USSR nostalgia, 2000–2008. Source: as Table 1. The wording of the question was ‘It’s a disaster [bol’shaya beda] that the USSR no longer exists’, and
respondents were invited to agree or disagree; the table shows rounded percentages. This question was not asked in the Belarus 2009 survey.
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Who – more than others – bemoaned the demise of
the USSR? On the evidence of our surveys (Table 6),
gender made relatively little difference, but age had
strong effects, and in the expected direction; across all the
variables we considered its effects were the most
consistent and substantial. Residence (not shown) made
little difference, but education was another powerful
predictor, and in the expected direction. So was self-
assessed income, in the same direction. We expected that
previous membership of the Communist Party would also
make a difference, in that they would be more likely than
others to regret the demise of the USSR, and this was the
case (although it made little difference if other family
members had been in the party). In Belarus, 39% of the
entire sample regretted the demise of the USSR, but 56%
of those who had been members of the Communist Party;
in Russia the corresponding ﬁgures were 57% of the entire
sample but 74% of those who had been party members;Table 6
Nostalgics by social characteristic (proportion in each country in respect of
each characteristic who agree or disagree with the proposition that ‘It is
a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists’). Source:
author’s surveys (Russia, 2008; Ukraine, 2007; Belarus, 2006), rounded
percentages, n¼ 2000, 1200 and 1000 respectively.
All M F <30 >60 1þ 2
ed
3
ed
Low
SoL
High
SoL
Russia
Agree 57 55 58 34 77 59 50 71 46
Disagree 32 36 30 50 15 31 41 22 41
Ukraine
Agree 48 49 48 22 64 57 37 58 28
Disagree 40 42 39 59 27 31 53 31 66
Belarus
Agree 39 40 39 22 57 40 37 51 32
Disagree 49 51 48 64 32 45 56 36 59and in Ukraine, 48% of the entire sample regretted the
demise of the USSR but 66% of those who had been party
members.
Did any of these differences have consequences for
the politics of the postcommunist years? We tested these
relationships in Table 7, and in a separate multivariate
regression. In Russia and Ukraine, but to a much lesser
extent in Belarus, those who assigned themselves to the
‘left’ were more likely to regret the demise of the USSR
than those who assigned themselves to the ‘right’, and
vice versa. USSR nostalgics were also more likely than
others to support the principle of state rather than
private ownership, and in each of the three countries.
We asked two foreign policy questions, one of them
about the Commonwealth of Independent States and the
other about NATO (which was the USSR’s historic
adversary, but which had begun to absorb former
communist-ruled countries into its membership from
1999 onwards). By very large majorities, Soviet nostal-
gics were in favour of a closer association among the
former Soviet republics, even the formation of another
unitary state, and emphatically so in Russia and Ukraine.
There were fewer differences in Russia when it came to
the (entirely hypothetical) question of NATO member-
ship; differences in Belarus and Ukraine were the most
pronounced.
Which of these differences ‘made a difference’? Was it,
for instance, because older respondents were older that
they were more likely to regret the demise of the USSR, or
because they (perhaps) had lower living standards, or
a lower level of education? We tested these relationships
in a separate logistic regression (not shown). On this
evidence, it is age and living standards that are the most
powerful predictors of Soviet nostalgia when other vari-
ables are held constant. All were statistically signiﬁcant at
the **p< 0.01 level, and in the expected direction: older
age-groups were more positive about the Soviet system,
and so were the less afﬂuent; younger age-groups and the
Table 7
Nostalgics by policy preference (proportion in each country in respect of each policy preference who agree or disagree with the proposition that ‘It is a great
misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists’). Source: author’s surveys (Russia, 2008; Ukraine, 2007; Belarus, 2006), rounded percentages, n¼ 2000,
1200 and 1000 respectively.
All Left Right State Private More CIS Less CIS Join NATO No NATO
Russia
Agree 57 79 54 66 40 67 40 56 61
Disagree 32 20 42 25 51 23 49 37 33
Ukraine
Agree 48 65 29 59 33 56 17 23 66
Disagree 40 21 65 32 57 33 81 73 22
Belarus
Agree 39 41 32 49 29 37 43 29 45
Disagree 49 55 57 40 62 55 49 63 46
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education is not a statistically signiﬁcant factor (secondary,
but not higher education made some difference in
Ukraine); nor is gender, as our bivariate analysis had
already suggested. Among them, the variables in our
model (age, gender, education and living standards)
correctly predicted a satisfactory 67.5 of cases in Russia,
64.1 in Belarus and 63.4 in Ukraine, with a p-value of less
than 0.000.4. Conclusion
Overall, we ﬁnd that communist nostalgia matters.
Most Russians (but not most Belarusians or Ukrainians)
regret the demise of the USSR, without necessarily
wishing to return to it. President Putin has himself
described the collapse of the USSR as the ‘greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’,6 and
surveys have found a consistently positive view of the
USSR in retrospect, and of a closer degree of integration
in the future. Belarusians and Ukrainians are less con-
cerned about the demise of the USSR (it was obviously
incompatible with the independence they had obtained
in 1991), and less likely to support the formation of
a unitary state of CIS member countries, but they strongly
supported a closer degree of cooperation; very few, in
any case, thought the CIS should be dissolved. Generally,
it was a ‘more democratic Soviet system’ that was the
most strongly supported form of government across the
three countries, but a broadly market-based economy
had more support than a command economy of the
traditional kind. This was a differentiated, not a simple
view of the communist legacy.
But wherever the mass public offered support to the
Soviet state and the economic and political principles on
which it had been based, thosewho regretted the demise of
the USSR were even more likely to do so. More than could
be explained by random variation, they were more likely
than other respondents to favour the restoration of
a wholly Soviet system of government, more likely to
favour a Soviet-type economy, and more likely (almost by
deﬁnition) to support the formation of a unitary state on6 Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 April 2005, p. 4.the basis of the CIS member countries. Regretting the
demise of the USSR also made a strong contribution, all
other things being equal, to the patterns of electoral
support that were apparent at parliamentary and presi-
dential elections in the three countries. Nostalgics were
much more likely to support parties of the left, or at least
those that favoured public ownership, a Soviet or ‘more
democratic Soviet’ system of government, and a closer
association among the former Soviet republics; they were
much less likely to support the parties that favoured
a ‘civilised divorce’, a wholly market economy, or Western-
style democracy.
‘Communist nostalgia’, at the same time, had to be
disaggregated. There were very different views about the
restoration of a unitary state in Russia and in Belarus and
Ukraine, where it was incompatible with their newly
acquired independence. There was support for a ‘more
democratic Soviet’ system of government, but at the
same time for the principles of the market economy. Not
many, in the postcommunist or indeed in the late Soviet
period, wanted a single party that exercised a political
monopoly, or restrictions on what they could say. But
there was a much larger constituency for full employ-
ment, low prices, comprehensive social welfare, and
a state that took direct responsibility for economic
management, particularly so after the international
ﬁnancial crisis began to develop in 2008. In none of the
three countries had there been a widely supported
movement for the overthrow of Soviet rule; in each of
them there was considerable support, in retrospect, for
many of the principles on which it had been based; and
attitudes of this kind were closely associated with elec-
toral choices and broader policy preferences. In this
sense, the communist everyday is also the post-
communist everyday.Acknowledgements
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Appendix. Our surveys were conducted by the
following agencies, and ﬁelded on the dates indicated;
full data ﬁles and questionnaires are available from
the UK Data Archive, or in respect of the most recent
surveys, when they have been deposited:
In Belarus,
2000: Fieldwork 13–27 April, Novak, n¼ 1090
2004: Fieldwork 27 March–18 April, Russian
Research, n¼ 1599
2006: Fieldwork 5–19 June, Centre for Sociological
and Political Research of the Belarusian
State University, n¼ 1000
2009: Fieldwork 2–24 February, Centre for
Sociological and Political Research of the
Belarusian State University, n¼ 1000
In Russia
1993: Fieldwork 12 December–13 January 1994,
Romir, n¼ 1046
2000: Fieldwork 19–29 January, VTsIOM, n¼ 1940
2004: Fieldwork 21 December 2003–16 January,
Russian Research, n¼ 2000
2005: Fieldwork 25 March–20 April, Russian
Research, n¼ 2000
2008: Fieldwork 30 January–27 February, Russian
Research, n¼ 2000
In Ukraine
1993: Fieldwork 3–15 December, Socis, n¼ 1000
2000: Fieldwork 18 February–3 March, Kyiv
International Institute for sociology, n¼ 1592
2004: Fieldwork 24 March–2 April, Russian
Research, n¼ 2000
2006: Fieldwork 24 April–12 May, Russian
Research, n¼ 1600
2007: Fieldwork 17 November–3 December, Socis,
n¼ 1200
Interviews were in all cases conducted face-to-face in respondents’
homes, based on the agencies’ normal sampling procedures and repre-
sentative of the population aged 18 and over. The agency’s standard
procedures were employed to check the completion of questionnaires and
the logical consistency of the data.
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